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Introduction
Mainstream economists have long argued that international trade improves welfare. While trade may redistribute income, theory assures us that under standard conditions the gains to winners are more than sucient to oset any losses incurred by those suering adverse eects from foreign competition. Belief in the Pareto-improving nature of trade made economists front-line advocates for the broad-based liberalization of commerce that was embedded in the General Agreement on Trade and Taris and other institutions built to manage the global economy after World War II (Bhagwati, 1989) Of course, introductory trade theory also teaches us that international trade is not generally Pareto improving. In their undergraduate textbook, Krugman and Obstfeld (2005, p64) write, Owners of a country's abundant factors gain from trade, but owners of a country's scarce factors lose... [C] ompared with the rest of the world the United States is abundantly endowed with highly skilled labor and (...) low-skilled labor is correspondingly scarce. This means that international trade tends to make low-skilled workers in the United States worse onot just temporarily, but on a sustained basis. For the rst three or four decades of the Bretton Woods era, however, there was little occasion to scrutinize the benets of trade. Most goods ows were North-Northbetween nations with relatively similar average incomeswhich helped subdue distributional impacts.
Views on how trade aects wages and employment turned less sanguine in the 1990s. As wage inequality rose, low-skill wages and employment fell, and manufacturing employment contracted in the U.S., globalization was seen initially as a prime suspect. Yet, after vigorous inquiry, concern about the labor-market consequences of trade receded. Economists did not nd trade to have had substantial adverse distributional eects in developed economies, either for low-skill workers specically or for import-competing factors and sectors more generally.
1 The broad sentiment that emerged in the literature was that labor-market developments were primarily attributable to technological changes that complemented high-skill workers and reduced labor demand in manufacturing. The impact of international trade on these outcomes seemed to be modest, at best.
Several pieces of evidence favored these conclusions. First, the share of U.S. employment in 1 For formal surveys of the literature on trade and wages, see Feenstra and Hanson (2003) and Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2011) . In developing economies, the labor-market impacts of globalization have been more diuse (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) . 1 manufacturing had been in decline since the end of World War II, peaking at 39.0% of U.S. nonfarm employment in January of 1944 and then falling decade over decade to a low of 8.6% in June 2015 ( Figure 1 ). The disappearance of manufacturing jobs was`nothing new.' Second, the steep rise in wage inequality and fall in real wages of low-education workers in the U.S. and many other developed countries did not coincide closely with rising trade openness. As noted by Feenstra (1998) and Leamer (2000) , the ratio of merchandise trade to GDP in the developed world rose steeply during the 1970s but stabilized thereafter, a fact that greatly weakened the case for trade causing rising wage inequality and falling low-skill wages during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Third, contrary to the predictions of textbook trade models, manufacturing industries in developed countries appeared to be substituting towards high-skill workers despite rising skill prices, suggesting that these industries were experiencing a skill-biased demand shift that emanated logically from the adoption of new technology (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998) . Although trade in the form of oshoring may produce such demand shifts, its modest scale in the 1980s and early 1990s meant that its estimated impacts were far smaller than those of investments in high-tech capital and equipment (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). 2 Finally, simple factor content calibration exerciseswhich rescaled traded-good imports into embodied labor importsfound that rising trade integration could account for only a small part of the fall in relative wages of low-skill workers in the U.S. (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Krugman, 2000) .
3 When Richard Freeman asked in 1995 if U.S. wages were being set in Beijing, his answer was an emphatic no.
The trade and wages debate reached something of a coda around the year 2000. A reasonable summary of the contemporaneous consensus was that:
1. Trade had not in recent decades been a major contributor to declining manufacturing employment or rising wage inequality in developed countries; 2. Workers employed in regions specializing in import-competing sectors could readily reallocate to other regions if displaced by trade; and 3. Due to the 'law of one price' for skill, any labor market impacts of trade would be felt by low-skill workers generally, not by trade-exposed workers specically.
2 A further development, seen initially as damning for trade-based explanations of changes in labor-market outcomes, was the simultaneous rise in wage inequality in developed and developing economies (Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998) . We now know that either in the presence of oshoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) or of heterogeneous rms and skill-technology complementarity (Burstein and Vogel, 2012; Sampson, 2014) , greater economic integration between countries may cause wage inequality to rise worldwide.
3 The usefulness of factor-content calculations for predicting labor-market outcomes was the subject of a spirited debate in the 1990s (Krugman, 2000; Leamer, 2000) . This debate has since been largely resolved by the discovery that a tight (though structurally model-specic) relationship between the factor content of trade and relative factor prices holds for a wide class of trade theories (Burstein and Vogel, 2011). 2 A corollary of these observations is that trade should aect prevailing wage levels nationally but not employment rates locally or regionally. Moreover, given the presumed uidity of U.S. labor markets, even in the short-or medium-run the aggregate gains from trade in the U.S. should be positive. Non-Farm Employment 1939 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 2004 2009 Source: FRED Economic Data https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?g=1Gor Just as the economics profession was reaching consensus on the consequences of trade for wages and employment, an epochal shift in patterns of world trade was gaining momentum. China, for centuries an economic laggard, was nally emerging as a great power, and toppling established patterns of trade accordingly. The advance of China, as we argue below, has also toppled much of the received empirical wisdom about the impact of trade on labor markets. The consensus that trade could be strongly redistributive in theory but was relatively benign in practice has not stood up well to these new developments. Nor has the belief that trade adjustment is relatively frictionless, with impacts that diuse over large skill categories rather than being concentrated among groups of workers in trade-competing industries or locations. In quantifying these impacts and adjustment frictions, recent evidence further suggests that the short and medium-run adjustment costs demanded 4 While these views may appear as a straw man, they are not. On point (1), see Baily and Bosworth (2014) .
On points (2) and (3), see Edwards and Lawrence (2010) . And on the broader implications of these points, see the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, 2015, chapter 7. 3 by large trade shocks are sizable entries in the accounting of gains from trade.
China's rise has provided a rare opportunity for studying the impact of a large trade shock on labor markets in developed economies. An emerging literature on this topic oers a wealth of evidence and surprises that should catalyze and discipline research for many years to come. We believe that this evidence calls into question the consensus of the early 2000s, and makes clear that, after the early Bretton Woods era aberration, the distributional consequences of trade are alive and well. While these results do not at all suggest that international trade is in the aggregate harmful to nationsindeed, China's unprecedented rise from widespread poverty bears testimony to trade's transformative economic powerit makes clear that trade not only has benets but also signicant costs. These include distributional costs, which theory has long recognized, and adjustment costs, which the literature has tended to downplay. Better understanding when and where trade is costly, and how and why it may be benecial, are key items on the research agenda for trade and labor economists. Developing eective tools for managing and mitigating the costs of trade adjustment should be high on the agenda for policymakers and applied economists.
This essay discusses ndings from the rapidly growing literature on China's rise that have enriched our understanding of the impact of trade shocks on developed countries. We begin by discussing why China's long-awaited reemergence is helpful for studying the impacts of trade on labormarket outcomes. We then oer a simple theoretical framework that guides inquiry on measuring and interpreting these impacts. Next, we present evidence on how trade shocks originating in China have aected industries and plants, local labor markets housing those plants, and individual workers employed (or formerly employed) in those industries and local markets. We suggest how these results should cause us to rethink the short-and medium-run gains from trade. Finally, we argue that having failed to anticipate how signicant the dislocations from trade might be, it is incumbent on the literature to more convincingly estimate the gains from trade, such that the case for free trade is not based on the sway of theory alone, but on a foundation of evidence that illuminates who gains, who loses, by how much, and under what conditions. (Naughton, 2007) . Seen in this context, skepticism about China's future, though far o the mark from today's vantage point, would then have been entirely warranted. China's share of world manufacturing activity China's quarter century of dizzying export growth began once the reformist camp rearmed its authority over economic policy in the early 1990s. Deng, in one of the nal political gambits of his career, launched his famous southern tour in 1992 to focus national attention on the successes of earlier policy experiments in a handful of locations on China's east coast (Vogel, 2011) . These eorts had included the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which allowed foreign companies to set up factories that imported inputs and exported nal outputs, relatively free from the interference of government minders (Yu and Tian, 2012; Alder, Shao and Zilibotti, 2013) . As reformers retook the helm, China embraced global markets more fully, pushing the number of SEZs from 20 in 1991 to 5 George Anders, How We Saw the Future in 1989, The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2014, p. R13. 5 150 in 2010. According to the World Bank, inows of foreign direct investment, which had averaged only 0.7% of GDP during the 1980s, surged to 4.2% of GDP during the 1990s and 2000s. Production for foreign markets began a spectacular ascent, with China's share of world manufacturing exports growing from 2.3% in 1991 to 18.8% in 2013 (Figure 2 ).
6
To provide context for China's reintegration into the world economy, we highlight key aspects of its recent performance that inform the analysis of attendant labor-market outcomes in developed countries. One is the idiosyncratic nature of China's transition from central planning to market orientation. The momentum of this transitionwhich has propelled China's tradeowes much more to dismal conditions in China at the time of Mao's death than to China's subsequent responses to contemporaneous shocks in high-income economies. Also important is the nature of China's postreform manufacturing surge. When and how China became the global factory is important for dening the scope and intensity of the China trade shock. Then, there is the structure of global trade balances. China's penchant for running large current account surpluses has shaped the temporal distribution of trade gains and losses arising from its growth.
Making Use of Trade Shocks
The interest of trade economists in China is driven both by its large quantitative importance as an exporter of manufactured goods, and by the paucity of natural experiments in international trade.
Among the most challenging issues for empirical analysis is that changes in trade policy in one country are often dictated by changes in the behavior of its trading partners. (Zhu, 2012) .
Second is the degree of China's isolation under Mao, which created abundant opportunities for later catch up (Zhu, 2012; Brandt, Ma, and Rawski, 2014 o, it ignited a phase of transitional growth that was governed largely by the country's accumulated productivity gap with the developed world (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011) .
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A nal key feature of China's risewhich we explore in more detail belowis its distinctive comparative advantage. Manufacturing is at the heart of the country's economic turnaround. Between 1991 and 2012, China's share of world manufacturing value added increased by a factor of six, from 4.1% to 24.0% (Figure 2 ). Whereas many large emerging economies specialize in primary commoditiesBrazil in iron ore, Indonesia in rubber, and Russia in oil and gasChina's advantage is overwhelmingly in industrial goods. Over the period 1990 to 2013, the manufacturing sector averaged 88% of China's merchandise exports, compared to 50% for Brazil, 46% for Indonesia, and 20% 
Revealed comparative advantage for China
China's manufacturing performance reects a comparative advantage in the sector that remained latent during the Maoist era. Today, China's net exports in manufacturing are strongly positive and its net exports of raw materials are strongly negative ( Figure 3A ). Its true strength in the sector emerged only in the 1990s. Figure 3B plots (Amiti and Freund, 2010) . The massive increase in China's industrial labor forceresulting from the decollectivization of agriculture, the closing of inecient state-owned enterprises, and the migration of 250 million workers from farms to citieshas made China the default location for all manner of labor-intensive production (Li, Li, Wu, and Xiong, 2012 ). Yet, factor abundance cannot be the whole story behind the country's specialization. Its advantage is far from uniform across labor-intensive industries (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014) . Figure 4 plots the change in net import penetration from China between 1991 and 2007 against the share of production workers in total employment in 1991 for 397 four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries.
13 We group industries into 10 sectoral aggregates, which share a common marker in the gure. That few points in Figure 4 show a negative change in net import penetration over the period reveals how U.S. imports from China grew by more than exportsoften substantially by morein nearly every industry.
The dominant pattern in Figure 4 is that industries within a sector tend to occupy a relatively narrow range on the horizontal axisindicating similar within-sector labor intensitybut a wide range on the vertical axisindicating highly varying within-sector changes in import penetration. 14 Apparel, leather, and textiles stand out in Figure 4 as the most labor-intensive activity, with an average initial share of production workers in industry total employment of 0.85. Still, the industries within this sector diverge sharply in their changes in import penetration. In some (e.g., women's non-athletic footwear, waterproof outerwear), the increase in penetration approaches or even exceeds 100 percent, which indicates that the 1991 to 2007 growth in imports from China is nearly equal to or greater than initial domestic spending on the industry. Other industries in the sector (e.g., coated fabrics, automotive and apparel trimmings) show near zero increase in import penetration. Similar patterns of dispersion hold for sectors with comparably high labor intensity, such as furniture and wood products (average initial production worker share of 0.82) and toys and miscellaneous products (average initial production worker share of 0.72).
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Bank denitions, manufacturing includes SITC sectors 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures except for division 68), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods). Food, fuels, ores and metals include SITC sectors 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), 2 (crude materials), 3 (mineral fuels), and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats), and division 68 (non-ferrous metals). 14 Employment of production workers is a standard, but not problem free, measure of industry intensity in low-skill labor. See Katz and Autor (1999) on the relation between production worker intensity and skill intensity. The cross-industry variation in Chinese export growth evident in Figure 4 is far from unusual.
The distribution of comparative advantage across industries for a country tends to be fat-tailed, such that for most countries a relatively small number of products dominate exports (Hanson, Lind, and Muendler, 2015) . Because of this skewness, U.S. industriesand the regions in which they locatevary widely in their exposure to import competition from China. As we discuss in section 4, this variation is very useful for identifying the labor-market consequences of trade shocks.
China's export surge in manufacturing accelerated after 2001, the year in which the country entered the World Trade Organization (Figure 2 (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012) .
dummies has an r-squared value of just 0.17, indicating that the majority of the variation in penetration occurs across detailed industries within subsectors.
Although the literature has yet to provide a full accounting of China's recent export growth, it has uncovered several mechanisms through which reform strengthened its manufacturing industries.
One such mechanism is privatization. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China idled many stateowned manufacturing enterprises, moving towards compliance with WTO provisions that sanction state subsidies for domestic industries. Capital and labor were then reallocated from smaller, less productive state-owned companies to privately owned manufacturing plants, raising productivity and output in the sector (Hsieh and Song, 2015) . Joining the WTO also forced China to phase out requirements that had obligated many private establishments to export through state intermediaries.
Such restrictions constitute barriers to export, which the WTO forbids expressly. Bai, Krishna, and Ma (2015) estimate that had private rms not been granted direct trading rights, China's manufacturing exports in the 2000s would have been one third smaller than they were. Along with greater ease in exporting, WTO membership gave Chinese manufacturers greater access to imported intermediate inputs (Brandt and Morrow, 2014) , which were an added boon to productivity (Manova and Zhang, 2012) . A further consequence of China's WTO entry regards the insecurity of its earlier MFN access to the U.S. market. Prior to 2001, China's MFN status in the U.S. was subject to annual reauthorization by Congress. Pierce and Schott (2015) and Handley and Limao (2014) argue that the lurking prospect of a return to non-MFN taris, which averaged 37.0% in 1999 and compared to average MFN taris of only 3.4% in that year, dissuaded Chinese rms from investing in exporting to the U.S.. WTO accession removed this uncertainty, and encouraged China-U.S. trade.
The Global Macroeconomic Context
The impact of China's recent growth on the global economy is not just about the country's long-run comparative advantage. Also important for the near-term labor-market consequences of its trade expansion is that China's trade surplus widened substantially. 
Current account balance (percent of GDP)
Trade imbalances complicate matters by introducing a temporal dimension into sectoral employment adjustment.
16 Suppose that policy distortions in Chinasuch as the excess absorption of credit by state-owned enterprises (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011) induce the country to run a trade surplus and the U.S. to run a trade decit. Growth in China's manufacturing sector due to enhanced productivity arising from its market transition would cause employment in U.S. traded industries to contract, pushing workers either into non-traded jobs or out of work entirely.
In eect, China would be loaning the U.S. the funds that it needs to enjoy positive net imports today. 18 These companies have rst call on loans from state-run banks, leaving private businesses to nance investment out of retained earnings and thereby elevating the corporate savings rate (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011) . Another, and perhaps less obviously relevant, distortion is China's one-child policy (recently relaxed), which increased male-female birth ratios and intensied competition in the marriage market (Wei and Zhang, 2011 ). Households whose one child is a son may have increased their savings rate to nance real estate purchases as a means of improving their child's marriage prospects. A third distortionadvanced by think tanks and politicians in Washington, D.C. (see, e.g., Cline, 2010) is that China has consciously undervalued its nominal exchange rate so as to promote its exports.
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Frustration with HO turned out to be a boon to research on trade and labor markets. Early approaches (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997 and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008 ) ipped the framework on its head by focusing on changes in the set of goodsor, more precisely, the set of intermediate inputsthat countries produce. Allowing for changes in specialization patterns creates a new adjustment margin between the production tasks a country performs at home and the others it oshores. Recent work has married HO with modern trade theories that incorporate heterogeneous rms. Burstein and Vogel (2012) embed a Melitz (2003) style model, in which rms dier according to their productivity, into an otherwise standard HO setting. Calibrating the model, and allowing for more productive rms to be more intensive in the use of high-skill labor, reveals that freer trade aects the wage premium for high-skill labor primarily through the Melitz mechanism of withinindustry shifts in employment toward more productive rms rather than through the HO mechanism of between-industry shifts in labor demand. In many analyses of the impact of productivity growth in China on global welfare, the literature dispenses with HO entirely, relying either on a Melitz-type setting (Hsieh and Ossa, 2015) or on the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of Ricardian comparative advantage (Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang, 2014) . Gone from current literature is the singular concern with estimating the impact of trade on the wage gap between high-skill and low-skill labor, which preoccupied inquiry in the 1990s. In its place is interest in a wider array of margins through which economies adjust to trade shocks.
The sketch of a theoretical framework that we provide in this section follows the recent trend of working with trade models that have a gravity structure (Arkolakis, Costinot, and RodriguezClare, 2012 ). These models do not lend themselves easily to studying the impact of trade on earnings inequality. They do, however, make it tractable to allow for varying degrees of labor mobility between regions or industries (Redding, 2012) . The presence of frictions in worker mobility creates an abundant set of margins along which we can observe how labor markets respond to trade shocks.
20 The task of empirical research then becomes to clarify which margins of adjustment are operational, to estimate the magnitude of adjustment along each margin at dierent time horizons, and to determine how long it takes for full adjustment to occur.
20 On adjustment to trade shocks at the rm level, see Amiti and Davis (2012) and Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch and Xiang (2014) ; on adjustment at the industry level, see Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) , Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips (2014) , and Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (forthcoming); and on adjustment to trade at the regional level see Borjas and Ramey (1995) , Topalova (2010) , Kovak (2013), and Hakobyan (2015) . 14 3.1
A Bare Bones Model
To characterize the theoretical mechanisms at work, it is sucient to allow for a single labor-market friction, which we designate as imperfect labor mobility across regions within a country. Allowing for geographic labor immobility runs counter to the belief that U.S. regional labor markets are integrated seamlessly. Yet there is mounting evidence that the movement of labor across U.S. cities and states in the aftermath of changes in regional labor demand is slow and incomplete (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Yagan, 2014) and that such incompleteness is strongest among less-educated workers (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Wozniak, 2010; Malamud and Wozniak, 2012; Diamond, 2015) .
21 Recent work on the impacts of trade with China, discussed in section 4, likewise conrms the slowness of regional labor-market adjustment.
In our model sketch, we make the extreme assumption of complete geographic labor immobility.
In an Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework, one can relax this assumption by allowing for worker heterogeneity in moving costs between regions (Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro, 2015) or for a Roy-type structure with worker heterogeneity in industry productivity (Galle, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yi, 2015) .
Either setting creates an upward sloping regional labor supply curve, whose slope may be steeper in the short or medium run than in the long run. Variation in regional exposure to foreign competition arises from dierences in regional industry specialization patterns. In Eaton and Kortum, these specialization patterns reect exogenous regional dierences in industry productivity. Empirical work does not take a stand on the origin of industry specialization, treating it as pre-determined in some period well before the China trade shock materializes.
We begin by describing how changes in China's export supply aect U.S. industry product demand, and are subsequently transmitted to changes in traded sector output at the U.S. regional level. If trade has a gravity structure, we can write total demand by the U.S. aggregate economy for traded output produced in U.S. region i as,
where X i is total sales by region i in the aggregate U.S. market, A ik is the production capability of region i in industry k, ik is the average iceberg transport cost for region i in shipping goods in industry k to the aggregate U.S. market, 22 is the trade cost elasticity, E k is U.S. aggregate 21 The empirical literature has yet to resolve whether slow regional employment responses to labor demand shocks are the result of labor-market frictions (e.g., search costs) or economic distortions (e.g., social insurance programs), a distinction that matters for welfare analyses of changes in the trading environment.
22 For expositional simplicity, we treat the aggregate U.S. marketwhich is in truth a collection of distinct regional marketsas a single entity. Traded output by region i thus refers to total shipments by the industries in i (e.g., manufacturing) that sell their output outside the region. Alternative versions of the gravity model dier in terms expenditure on goods in industry k, and¨k is the competitiveness of the aggregate U.S. market in industry k, dened as¨k
Consider the impact on traded output in region i of changes in production capabilities in the regions that supply the U.S. Totally dierentiating (1), and using x dx=x, we obtain the following equilibrium condition for the log change in region i's output:
where ik X ik =X i is the share of industry k in region i's total sales on the U.S. market, ik X ik =E k is the share of region i in total U.S. purchases in industry k, and subscript c indexes China.
For simplicity, we assume that A ik a A k w i , and that trade costs remained unchanged. 24
Equation (2) provides a reduced-form specication for estimating the impact of trade shocks emanating from China on regional economic activity in the U.S. or other countries. Most empirical analyses of the China trade shock base estimation on a specication like (2) or its industry-level counterpart.
25 Of primary interest is the nal term on the right of (2), which captures the impact of growth in China's productive capacity on traded output by U.S. region i. It can be rewritten as,
which is the weighted average exposure of region i to changes in U.S. industry import penetration that is mandated by changes in China's production capabilities. During the 1990s and 2000s, advances in Chinese manufacturing were driven by the country's market transition, which gave its rms access to foreign capital, technology, and inputs; allowed capital to move from the public to the private sector; permitted rural-to-urban migration; and ended restrictions on direct exporting by private enterprises. The ik weights in (3)the share of each industry in region i's total sales on the U.S. marketsummarize dierences in industry specialization patterns across U.S. regions and thus capture variation in regional exposure to China's supply-driven export growth.
of how A ik is determined. In Eaton and Kortum (2002) , this value is the product of the location parameter for the distribution of productivity for industry k in region i and unit production costs for industry k in region i.
23 For simplicity, we ignore sales by U.S. regions to foreign markets. Incorporating these sales is straightforward.
Equilibrium conditions not shown include factor-market clearing, to which we return below, and the balance of trade, discussed in the previous section.
24 The rst assumption implies that the change in production capability for region i in industry k can be decomposed into the exogenous change in national productivity in industry k ( A k ) and the change in wages in region i ( wi), consistent with Eaton and Kortum (2002) . We thus assume that the exogenous determinants of regional comparative advantage (e.g., the Eaton-Kortum productivity distribution location parameters) are unchanged.
25 See, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2015 To estimate the impact of the trade shock in equation (3) on regional labor-market outcomes, it is necessary to control for the confounding factors that also aect these outcomes. Helpfully, these confounds are summarized in the rst four terms on the right of (2). Anticipating the estimation approaches that we describe in section 4, we discuss each of these components in turn.
The rst term on the right of (2), P k ik E k , is regional exposure to U.S. industry demand shocks. Because observed changes in import penetration from China will be aected by both the rst and last terms in (2), they will embody changes both in U.S. product demand and in China's supply conditions. Any reduced-form regression of changes in regional outcomes on regional trade exposure may thus be contaminated by U.S. product demand shocks. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) propose using Chinese import growth in other high-income markets as an instrument for the growth in U.S. imports from China in order to isolate the foreign-supply-driven component of changes in U.S. import penetration. Specically, they instrument the observed change in U.S. industry-level import penetration from China with a non-U.S. exposure variable that is constructed using data on contemporaneous industry-level growth of Chinese exports to other high-income markets.
26 Table 1 26 These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Moving to the second term on the right of equation (2) 27 Alternatively, estimating a version of (2) that makes either the change in regional wages or the change in regional labor supply the dependent variable provides a test of the geographic mobility of labor in response to trade-induced labor demand shocks.
The third term on the right of (2) 
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they will dier in their exposure to sector-biased technological progress. Are regions that are more subject to technology shocks also ones that tend to face greater import competition? It appears not.
There is near zero correlation between exposure to technological change and exposure to trade with China across U.S. local labor markets Hanson 2013b, 2015) .
28 A related issue, to which we return in section 4, is whether exposure to trade with low-wage countries induces rms to step up innovation, making technology endogenous to trade.
Finally, the fourth term in (2) 
29
The specication in (2) does not comprise an input-output structure. The presence of intermediate inputs may aect the transmission of trade shocks within the U.S. Consider the case of tire production. If rising imports of Chinese tires causes U.S. tire producers to reduce their output, demand for U.S.-made synthetic rubber and steel ber, which are used as inputs in domestic tire production, may decline as well. The trade shock, which began in the U.S. tire industry, would also aect domestic demand in the industries that supply inputs to U.S. synthetic rubber and steel ber producers, as the shock works its way up the production chain. A full accounting of the impact of trade shocks thus requires incorporating input-output linkages between domestic industries (Pierce and Schott, 2015; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price, 2016) . A related possibility is that U.S. synthetic rubber and steel ber producers may benet from access to lower-cost inputs from China. Recent literature allows for both channels of transmission, from U.S. nal goods producers to their domestic input suppliers and from Chinese input suppliers to U.S. input buyers.
To summarize this discussion, identifying the impact of trade with China on U.S. local labor market outcomes requires a valid instrumental variableor, more broadly, a source of plausibly exogenous variationfor regional exposure to import competition, controls for regional exposure to technological change, and recognition that the estimated reduced-form impact may be attenuated 28 Hanson (2013b and measure regional technology exposure using an occupational composition index that captures the opportunities for substitution of computers for workplace tasks. This index is highly correlated with measures of computer adoption , but it is necessarily incomplete and would not be expected to capture industry-specic innovations that deviate from the overall pace of machine-labor substitution.
29 China's manufacturing growth is closely related to the expansion of global production networks in East Asia (Hsieh and Woo, 2005) . As China has grown, so too has its demand for imported inputs, which it assembles into nal outputs for shipment abroad. During the 2000s, approximately half of China's manufacturing exports were produced by export processing plants, which are dedicated solely to assembly of imported components (Yu and Tian, 2012) .
Over time, China has begun to produce an ever greater fraction of the inputs that it uses in export production, as it diversies away from pure processing trade (Brandt and Morrow, 2014) . Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2012) as a result of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, but the average decline was less than two percentage points, except in apparel and textiles (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2015) . Hence, changes in applied taris would seem to predict no more than modest growth in China's shipments to the U.S.
We discuss below how the observed reduction in U.S. MFN taris may not capture the full impact of changes in U.S. trade barriers on imports from China (Pierce and Schott, 2015) .
Labor Market Adjustment to Trade
If we suppose that the growth in U.S. manufacturing imports from China was triggered by a combination of productivity growth and improving foreign market access for Chinese rms, the shock that originated across the Pacic would rst manifest itself in the U.S. in terms of more intense competition in product markets. Next, the shock would be transmitted to the regions in which competing manufacturing industries are concentrated, to the U.S. sectors that supply these industries with inputs, and to the workers employed in manufacturing and its supplier industries. In this section, we empirically trace out the impacts of the China trade shock by examining consequences at each of these levels.
Industry Adjustment to Import Competition
The initial point of transmission of supply shocks in China to factor markets in the U.S. is the product market. Improvements in China's productive capabilities and reductions in its trade costs will change the intensity of competition for U.S. goods, leading to a contraction in U.S. industries subject to greater import exposure. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) use data on U.S. manufacturing plants for 1977 to 1997 to examine the consequences of increased exposure to import competition from lowwage countries, which they measure as the share of these economies in U.S. imports and which is 20 attributable in large account to China. 32 Consistent with the logic of equation (2), they estimate the following model for the impact of shifts in trade exposure on manufacturing employment:
¡L j a C 1 ¡IP j C X j0 C e j :
Here, ¡L j is 100 times the annual log change in employment in industry j over subperiod ; ¡IP j is 100 times the annual change in import penetration from China in U.S. manufacturing industry j over subperiod ; 1 is the estimated eect of exposure to import competition on industry employment; X j0 is a set of industry-specic start of period controls (suppressed initially); is a period-specic constant; and e j is an error term. 33 Table 2, European countries (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2015 Table 2 slightly aggregates the 397 manufacturing industries of Figure 4 to 392 industries in order to improve compatibility with other industry-level data such as the BEA input-output tables.
35 Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Philips (2014) describe how employment conditions change in the industries and occupations that are more exposed to U.S. multinational companies moving production oshore. In mild contrast 1991-1999 and 1999-2011 or 1999-2007) . Employment changes are computed in the County Business Patterns and are expressed as 100 x annual log changes. Observations are weighted by 1991 employment. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 135 3-digit industries. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Stacked First Differences 1991-2011 100 x Annual ∆ in U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports Table 3 , also based on Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016) , presents estimates of equation (4) in stacked rst dierences for the two time periods 1991 -2011 these results, the change in import penetration and a dummy for each time period are the only regressors. In column 1, which estimates the model without instrumentation, the import penetration variable is negative and highly signicant, consistent with the hypothesis that rising import exposure to the above results, they nd that trade exposure aects employment not through workers' industry of employment but through their occupation of employment. 22 lowers domestic industry employment. Nevertheless, this OLS point estimate could be biased because growth in import penetration is driven partly by domestic shocks. Column 2 instruments the observed changes in industry import penetration with contemporaneous changes in other-country China imports, as described above. The estimate in column 2 implies that a one-percentage-point rise in industry import penetration reduces domestic industry employment by 1.3 log points (t-ratio of 3.2). Column 3 which stacks the periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2007 , shows that the coecient of import penetration is similar if we restrict attention to the years preceding the Great Recession.
While it is clear empirically that employment in import-competing U.S. industries has shrunk in the face of China's rapid growth, the challenge for research is how to measure the distributional consequences and the net economic costs and benets of these labor-market impacts. The answers turn on mechanisms that are not self-evident from the basic facts above; specically: 
Regional Employment Impacts
To assess the distributional consequences of rising trade with China, we turn next to adjustments in local labor markets. Local exposure arises from the tendency of industries to cluster in specic regions of a country (Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010) . In the U.S., manufacturing employment is particularly concentrated in parts of the Midwest and Southeast. Even within these manufacturing regions, there is wide variation in the industry composition of local rms. Industry composition may be aected by trade shocks, however. In measuring regional trade exposure, we follow the literature in utilizing data on regional industry specialization patterns in the pre-shock period, thus preempting any endogenous adjustment of industry location to contemporaneous trade shocks. (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996; . Figure   6 shows the spatial distribution of exposure to increases in Chinese import competition from 1991 to 2007 across CZs. In the map of unconditional import exposure in Panel A, some broad regions have greater vulnerability to imports simply because they are more specialized in manufacturing overall.
For instance, Alabama and Tennessee, both strongly manufacturing-oriented, have a preponderance of trade-exposed commuting zones. Variation of trade intensity within regions becomes larger in Figure 6B , which plots import exposure conditional on the share of manufacturing in CZ employment as of 1990, thus measuring import competition for the local set of manufacturing industries. When looking within manufacturing, Tennessee, owing largely to its concentration of furniture producers, is far more exposed to trade with China than is Alabama, which has agglomerations of relatively insulated heavy industry. This variation of import exposure within local manufacturing sectors is the basis for much of the econometric analysis we discuss. With an average annual wage of about $40k per employee, the employment loss by 0.78%pt lowers annual income by about $312 (0.0078 36 Autor, Dorn, Hanson (2013) further document that this nding holds for workers at all education levels. For workers with less than a college education, increased trade exposure also predicts signicant reductions in CZ employment in non-manufacturing industries, suggesting the presence of negative local demand spillovers.
Column 5 of Table 4 further shows that import competition has very modest eects on the size of the working-age population in CZs. Tracing individual workers over time, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014) conrm that there is little geographic migration in response to the trade shock.
37 Thus, the industry-level impacts of Chinese import competition seen in Table 3 are equally visible within local labor markets. Contrary to the canonical understanding of U.S. labor markets as uid and exible, trade-induced manufacturing declines in CZs are not, over the course of a decade, largely oset by sectoral reallocation or labor mobility. Instead, overall CZ employment-to-population rates fall at least one-for-one with the decline in manufacturing employment, and generally by slightly more. These results run counter to a precept of general equilibrium trade theory that the local employment eect of sectoral demand shocks should be short-lived, as the forces of wage and price arbitrage and labor mobility dissipate these shocks nationally. In the limit, trade-induced shocks to local manufacturing employment should aect the allocation of labor across sectors but should have no measurable impact on employment rates in directly impacted CZs relative to the national labor market. That this neoclassical prediction does not appear to hold even approximately over the span of a decade suggests that the labor market impacts of trade shocks are likely to be amplied by slow and incomplete adjustment: rather than modestly reducing wage levels among low-skill workers nationally, these shocks catalyze signicant falls in employment rates within trade-impacted local labor markets.
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Regional labor-market consequences from exposure to trade with China have also been studied for countries other than the U.S.. Analyses for Norway (Balsvik, Jensen and Salvanes, 2015) and for Spain (Donoso, Martin and Minondo, 2014) , covering periods from the late 1990s to 2007, nd 36 The import per worker measure is a variant of equation (3) 37 Population responses to local trade shocks are also limited in other countries. Analyses from Germany (Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum, 2014) and Spain (Donoso, Martin and Minondo, 2014) both nd weak and statistically insignicant population adjustments in local labor markets that are exposed to import competition from low-wage counties.
38 Labor market adjustment to import competition from China may be also be incomplete because the trade shock continues to accumulate over time as imports from China grow. In the case of Brazil, however, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) also nd little spatial mobility and regional convergence in the years following a one-time trade liberalization shock.
results that are consistent with the U.S. evidence. Regions that face greater import competition experienced a dierential decline in manufacturing employment. Lower manufacturing employment was primarily compensated by higher unemployment in Norway, and by greater employment outside of manufacturing in Spain. Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum (2014) nd that in Germany, Chinese import competition also had a negative impact on manufacturing employment in local labor markets.
In the German case, the impact of rising Chinese import competition between 1988 and 2008 was compounded by an even more rapid growth of imports from Eastern Europe following the fall of the iron curtain. Distinct from the U.S. case, German manufacturers sharply increased exports to these lower-wage countries, resulting in a more modest trade decit with China and a trade surplus with Eastern Europe. The employment gains related to these export opportunities roughly oset the job losses from import competition in the case of China, while actually raising German employment in the case of trade with Eastern Europe.
Though this paper's focus is on the consequences of increased import exposure to China, this was not the only trade shock to aect local labor markets in the U.S. over the last two decades.
The North American Free Trade Agreement, enacted in 1994, stands out as a landmark change in U.S. trade policy, which led to the elimination of taris on U.S. imports from Mexico for the large majority of manufactured products. Both direct and indirect channels of transmission are important for wage outcomes. Wage growth for high-school dropouts employed in the industries that were initially the most protected, and therefore subject to the largest tari declines, was 17 percentage points lower than for comparable workers employed in initially unprotected industries. And high-school dropouts employed in locations that were initially the most specialized in industries vulnerable to NAFTA had a wage growth that was 8 percentage points lower than for similarly educated workers in locations with few protected industries. Surprisingly, the next most aected labor-market group is workers with some college education. NAFTA wage impacts for high-school educated workers are comparatively modest and for the college-educated are eectively zero. National Impacts versus Regional Impacts
The localized impacts of import competition measure the relative eect of the China trade shock on more versus less trade-exposed regional labor markets. Should we take these results to mean that trade-impacted locations suered employment declines in absolute terms, or simply that they beneted less relative to trade-insulated locations? This distinction between relative and absolute eects matters. The former encompasses the distributional eects of trade, whereas the latter bears on the magnitude of the net gains from trade.
Using an expanded version of equation (4) 
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Two additional sources of linkages between sectors operate through changes in aggregate demand and the broader reallocation of labor. When manufacturing contracts, workers who have lost their jobs or suered declines in their earnings reduce their spending on goods and services. The contraction in demand is multiplied throughout the economy, depressing consumption and investment. Helping oset these negative aggregate demand eects, workers who exit manufacturing may take up jobs in the service sector or elsewhere in the economy, replacing some of the earnings lost in trade-exposed industries. Because aggregate demand and reallocation eects work in opposing directions, we can only detect their net impact on aggregate employment.
To adjudicate among these mechanisms, Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016) supplement their analysis of U.S. industries with an analysis of U.S. commuting zones that adds an input-output structure to Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) . If the reallocation mechanism is operative, then when a local industry contracts as a result of Chinese competition, some other industry in the same commuting zone should expand. Aggregate demand eects should also operate within local labor markets, as shown by Mian and Su (2014) Are there positive employment eects from U.S. trade with China that the literature may be missing? One mechanism may work through the supply of imported inputs. The expanded ability of 41 While the employment impact of upstream import exposure in signicantly negative, the impact of downstream import exposure is estimated to be small and insignicant in aggregate. Point estimates suggest that manufacturing industries may expand employment when their supplier industries become exposed to Chinese competition (consistent with lower input prices), while employment outside manufacturing is negatively aected by shocks that propagate downstream (e.g., reduced employment in a wholesale business that used to buy locally produced manufactures).
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U.S. rms to oshore production to China may raise productivity for workers in the U.S. (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) , lower the relative price of intermediates (Auer, Degen, and Fischer, 2013) , or extend the range of nal goods that rms are capable of producing (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010) . Granting that such benets are plausible in theory, and have been found in other national contexts, neither Pierce and Schott (2015) nor Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) detect evidence of positive U.S. industry or regional employment responses to increased imported input supply. A second mechanism may be that increased competition in nal goods markets alters investments in innovation. Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2015) show that European apparel and textile rms that faced greater competition from China following the elimination of quotas under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement produced more patents, had higher productivity growth, and boosted purchases of new technology. Although intensied product-market competition may raise the incentive for innovation, it can just as easily work in the opposite direction. The aggregate impact of Chinese competition on U.S. innovation remains unknown.
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The reduced-form analysis suggests that the reallocation of labor across U.S. 
Wage and Transfer Impacts
Employment is not the only margin of labor market response to trade shocks. Column 6 of Table 4 shows that more trade-exposed CZs experience larger reductions in average weekly wages. Extending the analysis in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) using quantile regression, Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2015) document that these wage impacts of CZ-level trade exposure are concentrated among workers in the bottom four wage deciles. The reduction in wages is not limited to manufacturing, but indeed is concentrated outside that sector. While the shock to manufacturing industries seems to aect local wages more broadly, the presence of dierential wage impacts of trade across CZs suggests that these labor markets are indeed local, as spatial mobility is not suciently large to equilibrate wages at the national level.
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The estimates of Table 4 Yet, the impacts of trade shocks on transfer payments extend far beyond those tied to temporary downturns. Because trade-induced declines in local employment and wages appear persistent, a larger fraction of households in a CZ is likely to qualify for means-tested entitlements. As Figure 7 documents, more trade-exposed CZs experience larger per capita growth in publicly provided medical 43 Local labor market analyses for other developed countries nd signicant wage declines in response to import competition in Norway (Balsvik, Jensen and Salvanes, 2015) and Spain (Donoso, Martin and Minondo, 2014) , and an insignicant wage reduction in Germany (Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum, 2014) . In related work on a developing economy, Costa, Garred and Pessoa (2014) analyze the Brazilian experience of trade with China during the period care, consistent with more households qualifying for income-based health benets, and in government income assistance, consistent with more households meeting the threshold for welfare payouts. Trade exposure also contributes to an increase in disability benets, whose take-up is typically associated with permanent exit from the labor force (Autor and Duggan, 2003) . Retirement benets rise in more trade-exposed CZs, suggesting that adverse labor-market shocks induce more workers to retire earlier.
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Figure 7 relative growth in per-capita receipts of TAA benets. However, while TAA reacts elastically to trade exposure, it is far from the transfer category that responds most strongly in terms of dollar expenditure; the total volume of TAA spending is negligible relative to many other transfer programs.
A more trade-exposed CZ (dened to be one at the 75th percentile of change in imports per worker over 1991-2007) would see increased per capita take-up of TAA of only $0.23 when compared to a less trade-exposed CZ (dened to be one at the 25th percentile of change in importers per worker), while spending grows by more than $15 per capita for each of the three categories medical benets, federal income assistance, and Social Security retirement and disability benets (Figure 7 ).
Despite the responsiveness of local transfer payments to local import exposure, on the whole there appears to be limited regional redistribution of trade gains from winners to losers. Comparing again the residents of CZs at the 75th and 25th percentile of import exposure, those in the more exposed location experience a reduction in annual household wage and salary income per adult of $549, while per capita transfer income rises by about $58, thereby osetting just a small portion of the earnings loss (Table 4 , columns 7 and 8).
4.5 Worker Level Impacts
The evidence above suggests that trade adjustment is a slow-moving process, and that its costs fall heavily on trade-exposed local markets rather than being dispersed nationally. What these analyses do not answer is to what degree costs are born specically by workers employed at tradeimpacted rms rather than more broadly among comparably skilled workers in a locality. If within industries and local labor markets, adverse trade eects are dispersed among workers of comparable skills, the person-level costs of these shocks will be moderated. Alternatively, if, due to labormarket frictions or skill-specicity, the impact falls disproportionately on workers directly employed at import-competing establishmentsand even more so on relatively low-skill workers within these establishmentsthe adverse distributional consequences of trade exposure may be larger still.
Trade theory identies a wide range of mechanisms through which trade shocks will have differential eects across individuals. Heckscher-Ohlin reasoning suggests that the impacts of freer trade on real incomes will vary according to an individual's skill level. In a frictionless labor market, rapid mobility of workers across rms, industries and regions guarantees that wages adjust uniformly within skill groups in response to a trade shock, even if only a subset of industries or that is TAA certied.
47 Note, however, that household income is measured per adult (since only adults generate income), while transfer income is measured per capita including children (since some transfers are based on the presence of children). A household with children might thus oset somewhat more than 10 percent of its earnings loss.
33
regions are directly exposed to trade. Under imperfect worker mobility across jobs, trade shocks can have heterogeneous impacts within skill groups. Several recent models of labor-market adjustment to trade incorporate switching costs for workers who desire to move across sectors. Structural estimates of these models suggest that those costs may amount to several months or even several years of a worker's earnings (Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren, 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Ashournia, 2015) .
48 Labor-market frictions may also stem from search costs for rms (Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010) . These frictions tie worker outcomes to changes in foreign competition in the initial rm, industry or region of employment. Until recently, there has been little evidence on how individual workers adjust to trade shocks.
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Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014) examine the impact of import competition from China on the careers of individual workers using longitudinal data from the U.S. Social Security Administration. Their analysis contrasts the labor-market outcomes of workers who were ex ante observationally similar except for their initial industry of employment.
50 Workers whose 1991 industry subsequently became exposed to higher import penetration accumulate substantially lower earnings over the period of 1992 to 2007, compared to their peers with similar demographic characteristics and previous labor-market outcomes. These workers also experience greater job churning. They spend fewer years working for their initial rm, more years working outside their initial industry, and more years receiving Social Security Disability Insurance. This trade-induced job mobility is however not sucient to equilibrate career earnings between more and less trade-exposed workers.
Why don't employment transitions allow initially trade-exposed workers to fully recoup declines in earnings with the initial employer? The literature on job loss provides one potential answer (e.g., Neal 1995): displacement destroys industry-specic human capital, leaving aected workers in positions for which they are poorly suited relative to non-displaced workers. A parallel explanation is that workers' specic skills cause them to seek positions in which they remain exposed to import competition, notwithstanding the predilection of trade impacted workers to exit their original two digit sector. 49 Hummels, Jorgenson, Munch, and Xiang (2014) use data for Denmark to analyze the impacts of increased rmlevel imports on within-job spell earnings for workers.
50 There may, of course, be unobserved factors that aect how workers sort themselves across industries. Sorting based on unobservables would matter for the analysis if workers who were predisposed to lower lifetime earnings growth disproportionately selected themselves into industries subject to future import competition from China. 53 In other work, Donoso, Martin and Minondo (2015) study year-to-year labor market transitions in Spain over the period 1997 to 2011, and nd that import competition from China increases the likelihood that workers transition from employment to unemployment, and from employment in manufacturing to employment outside that sector.
seven ring roads, Shanghai's sparkling skyline, and Guangzhou's multitude of export factories none of which existed in 1980are testimony to China's success. What makes China so interesting to economists, in part, is that the timing of this growth was dictated by forces internal to the country and was therefore hard for outsiders to forecast. To maintain power, Mao was willing to subject China to a state of near perpetual political and economic upheaval, beginning with the collectivization of agriculture (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) , continuing on to the Great Leap Forward (1958 Forward ( -1961 and culminating in the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) . At each successive juncture, China fell further behind the rest of the world economically. Its reversal of fortune under Deng began tenuously before consolidating into the most rapid accumulation of wealth in human history.
If one had to project the impact of China's momentous economic reform for the U.S. labor market with nothing to go on other than a standard undergraduate international economics textbook, one
would predict large movements of workers between U.S. tradable industries (say, from apparel and furniture to pharmaceuticals and jet aircraft), limited reallocation of jobs from tradables to nontradables, and no net impacts on U.S. aggregate employment. The reality of adjustment to the China trade shock has been far dierent. Employment has certainly fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition. But so too has overall employment in the local labor markets in which these industries were concentrated. Osetting regional employment gains either in exportoriented tradables or in non-tradables have been dicult to detect in the data. Input-output linkages between sectors appear to have magnied rather than dampened the employment eects of trade both within regions and nationally.
How should labor-market responses to trade with China change the way that economists think about the gains from trade for the U.S. and other developed countries? One way is by recharacterizing the sets of individuals who are likely candidates for opposing distributional consequences from economic integration. The literature is perhaps too comfortable with characterizing factor markets in terms of just two national skill types, such that the essential margin of adjustment is the relative wage of more-and less-skilled labor.
54 Without question, a worker's position in the wage distribution is indicative of her exposure to import competition. In response to a given trade shock, a lower-wage employee experiences larger proportionate reductions in annual and lifetime earnings, a diminished ability to exit a job before an adverse shock hits, and a greater likelihood of exiting the labor market, relative to her higher-wage coworker. Yet, the intensity of action along other margins of adjustment means that we will misrepresent the welfare impacts of trade shocks unless we also account for a worker's local labor market, initial industry of employment, and starting employer.
54 Analyses based on the specic-factors model (e.g., Kovak, 2013) are of course immune to this criticism.
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The importance of location for evaluating trade gains depends on how long it takes for regional adjustment to occur. A presumption that U.S. labor markets are smoothly integrated across space has long made regional equilibration the starting point for welfare analysis. The U.S. experience of trade with China makes this starting point less compelling. Labor-market adjustment to trade shocks is stunningly slow, with local labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and local unemployment rates remaining elevated for a full decade or more after a shock commences. The persistence of local decline perhaps explains the breadth of public transfer programs whose uptake increases in regions subject to rising trade exposure. The mobility costs that rationalize slow adjustment imply that short-run trade gains may be much smaller than long-run gains and that spatial heterogeneity in the magnitudes of the net benets may be much greater than previously thought.
Using a quantitative theoretical model, Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2015) nd that in the immediate aftermath of a trade shock, constructed to mimic the eects of growth in U.S. imports from China, U.S. net welfare gains are close to zero. The ultimate and sizable net gains are realized only once workers are able to reallocate across regions in order to move from declining to expanding industries. Establishing the speed of regional labor-market adjustment to trade shocks should capture considerably more attention from trade and labor economists.
In a modern gravity-type trade model, moving from autarky to freer trade expands the set of product varieties to which consumers have access and thereby raises real income in inverse proportion to the change in the share of spending a country devotes to domestically produced goods (Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013).
55 Labor immobility amends this logic and gives local comparative advantage a central role in the analysis of trade gains. If workers cannot move between local labor markets easily or quickly and local patterns of comparative advantage are xedat least temporarilythe national gains from trade will depend both on the standard gravity mechanism of changing expenditure shares and on how easily workers within localities can resort into new industries. Galle, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yi (2015) demonstrate that in the limiting case where worker resorting is infeasiblesuch that both regional and worker comparative advantages are locked ina trade shock of the magnitude of the China surge would yield geographic dispersion in welfare gains whose standard deviation across regions equals twice the national mean. As the literature develops a clearer picture of the permanence of local comparative advantage, economic models will be better equipped to quantify the spatial dispersion in net benets from trade within a country.
55 Even in this seemingly benign setting, any individual country could lose from China's rise. Although productivity growth in China would necessarily raise welfare by expanding the product varieties to which a country has access, it may alsodepending on the sectors aecteddepress national incomes by attenuating home-markets eects or deteriorating the terms of trade (Hsieh and Ossa, 2015) .
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